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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Chirse, Steven Facility: Fishkill CF 
NY SID: 
DIN: 85-A-5212 
Appearances: 
Decision appealed: 
Board Member(s) 
who participated: 
Papers considered: 
Joseph Petito, Esq. 
2 Austin Court 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Poughkeepsie, New York 12603 
11-044-18 B 
October 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 17 
months. 
Crangle, Berliner, Davis 
Appellant's Briefreceived February 12, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Commissioner 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~d Vacated, remanded for de novo interview Modified to - - - - ---
~rmed _ Vac ted, remanded for de nov~ interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ __ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Fina] Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separpte fil}diugs of 
the Parole Board, if any were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel. if any, on i./.lr-29 II? i-6. . ... ~ "' 
Distribution: Appeals Unit- Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name: Chirse, Steven DIN: 85-A-5212
Facility: Fishkill CF AC No.: 11-044-18 B
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Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 17-month hold. 
Appellant is serving a term of imprisonment of 25 years to Life after having been convicted 
by verdict of two counts of Murder 2nd.  Appellant shot and killed an off-duty police officer. 
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary 
and capricious, made in violation of applicable legal authority, and relied too heavily upon the 
serious nature of Appellant’s crime of conviction; (2) Appellant’s positive accomplishments, 
rehabilitative efforts, and certain COMPAS scores were not given sufficient consideration by the 
Board, and a risk and needs assessment instrument was not prepared for Appellant; (3) the Board’s 
decision was conclusory and lacked sufficient detail; (4) the Board improperly considered 
Appellant’s juvenile and youthful offender records; (5) the Board’s decision was made in violation 
of Appellant’s due process rights; (6) the Board’s decision was tantamount to a resentencing of 
Appellant; (7) the Board’s decision was predetermined; and (8) the 17-month hold was excessive.  
As to the first and second issues, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely 
as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering 
if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will 
not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law 
§259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268; Matter 
of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well 
settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, 
e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter 
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of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each 
factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In 
the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it 
must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 
914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 
A.D.2d 128. 
In 2011, the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles 
to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
§8002.2(a).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument, 
thereby negating Appellant’s claim that the Board did not have a risk assessment instrument 
prepared for Appellant.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 
870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 
N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 
1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate 
the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the 
statutory factors including the instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three 
substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. 
See Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular 
result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, 
the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory 
factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera 
v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord 
Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter 
of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Furthermore, 
declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter 
of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).   
As to the third issue, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the 
reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name: Chirse, Steven DIN: 85-A-5212
Facility: Fishkill CF AC No.: 11-044-18 B
Findings: (Page 3 of 4)
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 
N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d 
Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
 As to the fourth issue, the Board may consider a youthful offender (“YO”) adjudication in 
denying parole.  Matter of Cobb v Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1500, 59 N.Y.S.3d 915 (3d Dept. 2017); 
Matter of Amen v. New York State Div., 100 A.D.3d 1230, 954 N.Y.S.2d 276 (3d Dept. 2012); Matter 
of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Martin v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 47 A.D.3d 1152, 851 N.Y.S.2d 664 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Waters 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 271 A.D.2d 779, 706 N.Y.S.2d 213 (3d Dept. 2000); Matter of 
Pina v. Hammock, 89 A.D.2d 799, 453 N.Y.S.2d 479 (4th Dept. 1982).  The Board may also cite an 
inmate’s juvenile record in denying parole release.  Matter of Waters v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 271 A.D.2d 779, 706 N.Y.S.2d 213 (3d Dept. 2000); cf. U.S. v Daniels, 929 F.2d 128 (4th 
Cir. 1991). 
As to the fifth issue, the Supreme Court has held that because a person's liberty interest is 
extinguished upon conviction, there is no inherent right, or right under the U.S. Constitution, to 
parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); 
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).  Likewise, there is no due process right to parole under the 
New York State Constitution. Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979); Matter of Russo, 
50 N.Y.2d 69; Matter of Freeman v. New York State Division of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174 (3d Dept. 
2005). Thus, the protections of the due process clause do not apply to the Parole Board’s 
determinations as to whether an inmate should be released to parole supervision. Maldonado v. 
Evans, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183163 (W.D.N.Y. 2014); Barrow v. Vanburen, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 181466 (N.D.N.Y. 2014); Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2001).  We recognize, 
however, that while an inmate has no vested right to parole release under the due process clause, 
there is a liberty interest which requires, as a matter of procedural due process, an opportunity to 
be heard, and a statement of the reasons for the denial of release.  Therefore, in deciding whether 
to grant or deny parole, all the Board must do is: (1) afford the inmate an opportunity to be heard, 
and (2) if parole is denied, provide the reasons for the denial. Thurman v. Allard, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18904 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Blackett v. Thomas, 293 F.Supp.2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Gittens 
v. Thomas, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9087 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  Appellant received both of these 
constitutional protections and, therefore, any arguments alleging that the Board’s decision was 
made in violation of the due process clause, and in contravention of a liberty interest arising from 
the due process clause, are without merit. 
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As to the sixth issue, Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an 
improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine 
the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set 
forth therein. See Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 
A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. 
Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  Appellant has 
not in any manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 
A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).
As to the seventh issue, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to judges 
and administrative fact-finders.  See People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 
A.D.2d 914 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to have followed applicable statutory 
requirements and internal policies when making decisions regarding the suitability of an inmate’s 
possible release to parole supervision. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000).  There is no evidence 
that the Board’s decision was predetermined.  See Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 
A.D.2d 899 (3d Dept. 2000).   
  
As to the eighth issue, the Board has discretion to hold an inmate for a period of up to 24 
months. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b); Matter of Tatta v. State of 
N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 
604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 
(3d Dept. 2013).  Therefore, the hold of 17 months was not excessive or improper. 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
